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Abstract.  This article provides guidelines for the design and modification of loci and aviation from a 
security perspective. 
 
Given that it is cost-prohibitive and defies most definitions of common sense to destroy all airports and 
loci of aviation and start again in the aftermath of some aviation security tragedy, one must attend to 
both the physical design of new loci of aviation as well as the modification of existing loci. 
 
Even if there were infinite resources to design and modify airports and loci of aviation to maximize 
security, one might still wittingly or unwittingly be unaware of, ignore, or discount what might need to 
be done.  Given that there are only finite resources, identifying what needs to be done and what most 
needs to be done to maximize security becomes an even more crucial task. 
 
One guideline is that a one-size-fits-all approach will not fit all loci of commercial and general aviation.  
Each locus will have a different probability of being targeted by various security threats.  Each locus and 
variant of commercial and general aviation will pose different security consequences for the same 
physical vulnerability.  Each variant of commercial and general aviation will pose different economic 
consequences for the same degree of security protection.  To the last point, one must note that 
destroying the economic viability of a mode of aviation in deference to security is tantamount to 
destroying a village to save it. 
 
Another guideline is to establish a systems as opposed to a piecemeal approach to physical design and 
modification.  The isolated identification and fixing of specific security vulnerabilities could even 
increase the insecurity of a locus of aviation as a whole.  As well, what looks like a physical vulnerability 
in isolation may be nothing of the kind in the context of the system in which it resides.  An 
approximation of a systems approach is a layered one in which various security technologies and 
procedures are integrated to produce some estimated and cumulative value. 
 
Yet another guideline is that a physical systems approach may be meaningless and yield an unknowable 
degree of security without a further integration of social design and modification.  Here one must focus 
on individual, group, and larger concatenations of behavior and behavioral dynamics that can contribute 
to the security value of physical design and modification as much as physical design and modification 
can contribute to behaviors, their dynamics, and their security value. 
 
A final guideline relates to the sine qua non of intelligence in defining the security threat and in 
identifying which physical vulnerabilities are worthy of design and modification intention in the context 
of finite resources.  Otherwise, one would be at the mercy of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
research capabilities of terrorists and other potential security violators.  One would either guess wrong 
about the threat or guess right at one point in time and then see that right become wrong at a later 
point in time because of the expense of changing one’s physical security posture to match the changing 
security threat.  This suggests that the optimal security stance is to engage in a continuously changing 
physical design and modification activity—viz., an activity that would mitigate against significant sunken 
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costs and against difficult-to-erect, -modify, and -maintain physical security structures.  In addition, one 
needs to deduce, induce, or otherwise empathize with how a physical layout and the behaviors 
associated with it are perceived by those presenting a security threat.(See Mastroianni, G. R. (2002). 
Milgram and the Holocaust: A reexamination. Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology, 22, 
158-173; Paranjpe, A. C. (2002). Indigenous psychology in the post-colonial context: An historical 
perspective. Psychology & Developing Societies, 14, 27-44; Weigert, A. J. (2003). Terrorism, identity, and 
public order: A perspective from Goffman. Identity, 3, 93-113; Zebrowitz, L. A. (2003). Commentary: 
Overgeneralization Effects in Perceiving Nonverbal Behavior: Evolutionary and Ecological Origins. Journal 
of Nonverbal Behavior, 27, 133-138.) 
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